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PROTECTING THE AUDITOR'S WORK
PRODUCT FROM THE IRS
Congress has given the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) broad
investigatory powers to audit taxpayers,1 but these powers should not
be unlimited.2 Many Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) seek some
limitation on IRS access to the workpapers the CPA prepares during
the annual audit of a company's financial statements.3 Specifically,
CPAs resist IRS access to their analysis of a company's tax accounts4
and to their audit work programs.5
The IRS views the CPA's workpapers as valuable tools in
1. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976). "The power of the IRS to investigate the records and affairs of
taxpayers has long been characterized as an inquisitorial power .. " United States v. Matras,
487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973). See note 9 infra and accompanying text. Such "inquisitorial"
powers are a necessary part of our self-reporting system of taxation. See note 18 infra and
accompanying text.
2. "[The Government may not exercise its investigative and inquisitorial power without
limit. . . ." United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968). See United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 653 (1950).
3. As part of this review of the financial statements, the CPA prepares audit workpapers.
These workpapers consist of "the records kept by the independent auditor of the procedures he
followed, the tests he performed, the information he obtained, and the conclusions he reached
pertinent to his examination. Working papers, accordingly, may include work programs, analyses,
memoranda, letters of confirmation and representation, abstracts of company documents, and
schedules or commentaries prepared or obtained by the auditor." 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 338.03. The courts generally permit IRS access to audit workpapers.
See, eg., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982). But see notes
4-5 infra and accompanying text for the portions of the workpapers that CPAs want to deny the
IRS. Professional accounting standards provide that "the objective of the ordinary examination
of financial statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness
with which they present financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial position
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." Id § 110.01.
4. The review of the tax accounts shown in the tax accrual workpapers generally consists of
three parts. The auditor prepares a summary of transactions recorded in the tax accounts of the
company's general ledger;, computes the tax provision (estimate of tax liability) for the year being
audited; and then prepares the tax contingency memorandum, discussing items reflected in the
financial statements about which he is uncertain as to the ultimate tax treatment by the IRS. I
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 4024.2 (May 14, 1981). See United States v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327 n.6 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720
(1st Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
5. The audit work program is the "master plan" for the audit. It details the audit
procedures that are to be performed. As the work is performed the auditor checks off the steps
completed. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327 n.6 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot,
623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
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reviewing company tax returns.6 Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) grants the IRS the power to reach such workpapers. The
section permits the IRS to summon "any ... person the Secretary or
his delegate may deem proper ... to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data ...as may be relevant or material to" an
inquiry into a taxpayer's tax liability.7 The courts have given this
statute a liberal construction,8 describing the IRS's powers as
"inquisitorial" 9 and comparing them to the powers of a grand jury.10
Two courts have applied this liberal construction to permit the IRS
access to auditors' workpapers.I The other two courts considering the
issue have denied access based on the public benefits from unrestricted
CPA audits.' 2 The CPA auditors believe that IRS access to their
6. See Nath, Internal Revenue Service Summonses for "Sensitive" Accountant's Papers, 34
VAND. L. REV. 561 (1981) (supporting full IRS access to CPAs' workpapers).
The IRS considers many third party documents to be useful tools in performing its audits.
This comment focuses only on the CPA auditor's workpapers. For examples of cases involving
other IRS tools, see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (information used by a third
party tax return preparer); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (workpapers prepared by an
accountant working for an attorney); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (workpapers prepared by company's own internal auditors); First
Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) (records of company's bank);
United States v. El Paso Co., 82-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9534 (5th Cir. 1982) (tax contingency memorandum
prepared by company's own tax department).
7. I.R.C. § 7602(2) (1976).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1980); United States v. Continental
Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir. 1974).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); United States v. Acker, 325
F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The IRS does not need to show probable cause to support its summons because such a
requirement would unduly restrict its power to investigate. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379
U.S. 48, 53 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950); United States v.
Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970); De Masters v. Arend,
313 F. 2d 79, 88 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
11. Two federal district courts have upheld IRS summonses of tax accrual workpapers and
audit work programs. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill.
1981); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal
dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.) (Arthur Andersen & Co. had turned the workpapers
over to the IRS), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). The Fifth Circuit has recently supported
access to tax contingency memoranda in United States v. El Paso Co., 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9534 (5th
Cir. 1982). The case concerned tax workpapers prepared by the company's own tax department.
Certainly the company's own documents should not be denied to the IRS; thus, ElPaso adds little
to the analysis of independent CPAs' workpapers.
12. The two courts of appeals considering the issue have denied access to some of the
auditor's work papers. In the first of the CPA auditor workpaper cases, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit denied access to the auditor's workpapers. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit originally rejected the
Coopers & Lybrand reasoning in a case that dealt specifically with internal audit workpapers. See
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workpapers threatens their ability to perform an effective audit of
company financial statements.13 CPA audits are an important
protection for the investing public against misleading information in
corporate financial statements. Thus the Securities and Exchange
Commission, as well as the accounting profession and the corporate tax
community, believe that the IRS's access to auditors' workpapers
should be restricted.14
This comment addresses the conflict between the IRS and the
CPAs. Part I discusses the IRS's reasons for wanting access to the
auditors' workpapers and the CPAs' reasons for strongly opposing such
access. 15  Part II explores possible responses to this problem and
reviews the approach of the IRS, suggestions by the CPAs, and possible
court responses. It then suggests a possible solution requiring
congressional action.' 6 The comment concludes that the appropriate
congressional response would be to adopt as positive law a solution
similar to that used by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United v. Arthur Young & Co., which is one of the cases that granted
protection to the auditors. 17
I. THE DISPUTE
A. The Position of the IRS.
The IRS's broad investigatory power is a necessary part of our
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
Later, when directly faced with the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited
access to the auditor's workpapers. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320
(2d Cir. 1982). This decision partially reversed the district court's decision to permit access to the
auditor's workpapers while denying access to the audit work programs. See United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 496 F.Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted
to Reach Accountant's Workpapers? 51 J. TAX'N 194 (1979); Sumner & Reed, New IRS Guidelines
areAccountants'Best Hopefor Protecting Tax Accrual Workpapers, 27 TWX'N FOR AcCT. 72,73-75
(Aug. 1981); Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability ofAccountants' Tax Liability
Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q. 185, 200-08
(1982).
13. See Hanson & Brown, CPAs' Workpapers: The IRS Zeros In, J. AccT. 68, 70 (July
1981); Professional, J. AccT. 18, 20 (Mar. 1981) (statement by D. R. Carmichael, vice-president-
auditing, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)). See generally United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975), a 'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1977) (testimony of Marvin Stone, past president of AICPA). See also Remarks by Roscoe L.
Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue, note 73 infra and accompanying text.
14. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 68.
15. See notes 18-71 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 143-62 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 12 supra. This comment advocates an approach very similar to that taken by
both the Arthur Young court and by Note, supra note 12 at 200-08. This comment attempts to
examine alternative solutions to the CPA-IRS dispute and provide arguments in support of the
Arthur Young court's result.
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self-reporting system of taxation. 18 The IRS is at a disadvantage in its
examination of tax returns because the taxpayer or his agent possesses
the sources of information the IRS needs to audit the return. Neither
the taxpayer nor his agents should be permitted to refuse IRS access to
the materials used to prepare the taxpayer's tax return; the IRS cannot
conduct an audit without this information. Similarly, the taxpayer can-
not be permitted to offer the IRS volumes of records through which the
IRS cannot possibly sift.' 9 The IRS agent should be given the tax-
payer's records in their most useful form. Ideally, the IRS should have
a "road map" that explains the tax return and highlights the taxpayer's
positions on questionable items.
The IRS views the CPA's audit workpapers as such a road map,20
and the audit work programs provide the key to understanding the au-
dit workpapers. 21 Also, the work programs list the areas in which the
CPA has done substantial work, and thus show the IRS agent those
areas that may require less attention.22 More importantly, the tax ac-
crual workpapers--especially the tax contingency memorandum con-
tained in the workpapers-reveal the CPA's assessment of the
company's potentially questionable tax positions.2 3 The tax contin-
gency memorandum effectively provides the IRS with an outline for its
investigation. The memorandum is also useful to the IRS because the
CPA auditor is often privy to tax positions assumed by the company
that the company would prefer the IRS not know.2 4 This does not
mean that the company is breaking the law-the CPA would indirectly
disclose this25-but it does mean that there are gray areas in the tax
code that the taxpayer can legally use to his advantage, but would
18. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1975); United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 954 (D. Colo. 1975), af§'d, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). See Ray-
mond, New Case Sets Limits on Service's Summons Power Under Section 7602, 44 J. TAX'N 172
(1976).
19. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 70. Jerome Kuntz, former Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, commented that the taxpayer cannot be permitted to say: "Here is the haystack; the
needle is in here, somewhere, and it's your problem to find it." Id.
20. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977). See generally
Ord, The IRS's Right ofAccess to the CPA's Workpapers and Client Records, 4 TAX ADVISER 516
1973). See also United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973).
21. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977).
22. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F.Supp. 942, 947 (D. Colo. 1975), a27'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Barnes, IRS Access to Accountants' Workpapers: the Coopers &
Lybrand Case, 7 TAX ADVISER 44, 45 (1976).
23. See note 4 supra.
24. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1981); United States
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975), ajf'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977). The tax contingency memorandum discusses these tax positions. See note 4 supra.
25. See text accompanying notes 108-18 infra.
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rather not go to court to defend. For example, a corporation usually
may deduct its president's salary as a business expense, but if the presi-
dent is a major stockholder of the company, part of the salary is argua-
bly a nondeductible dividend.26 Also, fixed assets may be depreciated
over their expected lives, and this depreciation is a deductible ex-
pense.2 7 Reasonable persons may differ, however, on the expected life
of the asset. A company will discuss such gray areas with its auditors,
but it cannot be expected to discuss them as candidly with an investi-
gating IRS agent. Thus the CPA's workpapers are highly useful to the
IRS.28
B. The Position of the CPAs.
The goal of the CPA's audit is to prepare an opinion on the com-
pliance of a company's financial statements with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 29 GAAP, in the form of Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB) 5, require auditors to review contin-
gencies that could affect the company's financial statements. 30 One
such contingency is that the IRS will audit the company's tax return
and make material adjustments to it. The auditor must estimate the
probabilities of such adjustments and their magnitude.31 The account-
ant's principle of conservatism 32 requires him to analyze the return to
determine the result "if every assumption on which the taxpayer based
his tax were to go against him in some kind of litigation. ' 33 The ac-
26. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975), af'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
27. I.R.C. § 167. Recent revisions to the tax code will make this problem less pronounced in
the future. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 201-09, 95 Stat. 172,
203-07 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); United States v. El Paso Co., 82-2 U.S.T.C.
9534 (5th Cir. 1982).
28. See Nath, note 6 supra, at 1573-1614. Nath also points out that the audit workpapers
may help show the fraudulent intent needed as proof in a tax fraud investigation. Zd at 1581-83.
His analysis ignores the CPA's duty to indirectly "blow the whistle" on illegalities. See notes 108-
18 infra and accompanying text.
29. See note 3 supra.
30. 4 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AC § 4311 (incorporates FASB 5, as
amended).
31. Id. §4311.08.
32. Conservatism is the hallmark of accountants, and accounting literature supports the con-
vention of conservatism. "Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of signifi-
cant uncertainties. Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred
that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstate-
ment of net income and net assets. This has led to the convention of conservatism." Id. at AU
§ 4311.83.
33. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), a 9'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) (testimony of Marvin Stone, past president of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants).
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countant then sets forth an analysis of tax contingencies, which in-
cludes the "worst case," in the tax contingency memorandum in the
tax accrual workpapers.
The auditor needs the company's assistance in preparing this
memorandum. An audit requires candid discussions between the audi-
tor and company personnel; general ledgers and journal entries simply
do not reveal fully a company's financial position.34 CPAs fear that
permitting IRS access to the auditors' workpapers will cause knowledg-
able companies to be less candid with their auditors. Because they fear
that this potential loss of candor will impair the quality of their audits,
CPAs oppose IRS access to their workpapers.35 Since the IRS began
aggressively pursuing audit workpapers, CPAs have noticed that com-
panies have become reluctant to discuss sensitive issues with them.3 6
Without candid discussions, the auditor cannot review contingencies as
required by FASB 5. As a result, the auditor may not be able to give
an unqualified opinion on the company's financial statements; instead,
he may have to give a qualified or adverse opinion or a disclaimer.37
The Securities and Exchange Commission and other users of financial
statements object to these limited auditors' opinions.38 Arguably, their
disapproval of these opinions could force companies to be fully candid
34. In performing an audit, auditors do more than review the company's books. The third
Standard of Field Work of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards states that "[s]ufficient compe-
tent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirma-
tions." I AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 150.02.
35. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F.Supp. 996, 1000 n.6 (N.D. IlM. 1981); United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), aj'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977);
Hanson & Brown, note 12 supra.
36. News Report, J. AcCT. 8 (May 1981); Professional, J. AcCT. 19 (Mar. 1981) (statement by
William L. Raby, chairman of the AICPA Federal Taxation Executive Committee).
37. Auditors are required "to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter. . . to afford a
reasonable basis for an opinion on the financial statements." Without this information, the audi-
tor cannot "issue an unqualified opinion on the financial statements." Auditing Interpretation of
SAS No. 31: EvidentialMatter, J. AcCT. 122 (Mar. 1981). One such limitation affecting the opin-
ion would be on "the auditor's access to information he considers necessary to audit the tax ac-
crual." Id. Auditors use four different standard opinions to report the results of their audits. The
unqualified opinion "states that the financial statements present fairly financial position, results of
operations and changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles [which mandate adequate disclosure] consistently applied." 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 509.28. A qualified opinion states that the auditor found compliance
"except for" or "subject to" a material departure from "generally accepted accounting principles,
a material change in accounting principles applied, or a significant uncertainty." Id. § 509.29.
"An adverse opinion states that financial statements do not present fairly the financial position,
results of operations or changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." Id. § 509.41. Finally, a "disclaimer of opinion states that the auditor does
not express an opinion on the financial statements." Id. § 509.45.
38. Barnes, supra note 22, at 46.
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with their auditors despite the risk of an IRS review of the auditors'
workpapers.39 As a practical matter, however, companies probably will
reveal only the minimum amount of information necessary to satisfy
their auditors. Obviously the CPA cannot know that he is missing in-
formation unless he knows that the information exists, and the com-
pany is often the only source of some information. Auditors are the
public's agents in reviewing financial statements. When fear of IRS
summonses limits the auditors' reviews, the investing public will suffer
because it cannot obtain critical information concerning companies'
financial positions.
Aside from the potential threat to the effectiveness of the auditing
process, CPAs object to IRS review of their workpapers because they
regard this review as a fishing expedition4 o and as a mind-scan.41 Even
though the IRS does not have to show probable cause for its sum-
monses,42 the courts usually will not let the IRS go on a true "fishing
expedition," especially for documents held by parties other than the
taxpayer.43 Thus, the courts protect the CPAs from IRS "fishing expe-
ditions" in their workpapers. 44 Most courts do not protect CPAs from
IRS mind-scans, however. The auditor's workpapers reveal his assess-
ment of the taxpayer's tax positions. Thus, access to such workpapers
allows the IRS to scan the auditor's mind.
In Hickman v. Taylor45 the Supreme Court rejected a similar
mind-scan of attorneys. In that case, the petitioner requested access to
workpapers prepared by the respondent's attorney. These papers in-
cluded mental impressions of the attorney. Despite a general policy
toward liberal discovery,46 the Court limited access to the attorney's
work product, thus guarding against a mind-scan of the attorney:
39. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 at 83829 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nath, supra note 6, at 1291-93. See gener-
aly Bynum, Evidence-Privileged Communications- Accountant and Client, 46 N.C.L. REV. 419,
425 (1968).
40. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977).
41. Diss & Hanson, Tax ContingencyAudit Workpapers: Current Deveiopment, Observations,
andProposals, 12 TAx ADVISER 104, 109 (1981). See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F.
Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975), aj7'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Hanson & Brown, supra
note 13, at 70 (July 1981).
42. See note 10 supra.
43. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973); First Nat'1 Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d
532, 536 (5th Cir. 1947); see United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1975). Contra,
United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970).
44. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440,
445 (1964); see also I.R.C. § 7402(b) (1976).
45. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46. Id. at 506.
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When Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court
and the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or
contemplate that all the files and mental process of lawyers were
thereby opened to the free scrutinizing of their adversaries. And we
refuse to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh and
unwarranted a result.47
CPAs would argue that similarly "harsh and unwarranted results"'4
occur when a court permits a mind-scan of a CPA.49
A mind-scan is an unwarranted result because it destroys the
mental privacy that a professional needs to work effectively. The un-
tenable nature of working without privacy led the Supreme Court to
adopt the attorney work-product rule. In Hickman v. Taylor, the Court
stated:
In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intru-
sion by opposing parties and their counsel.... This work is re-
flected . . . [in] the "work product of the lawyer." Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what
is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thought, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own .... The effect
on the legal profession would be demoralizing.50
Working without privacy is as demoralizing to the accounting profes-
sion as it would be to the legal profession. The CPAs have carried the
mind-scan argument further, arguing that the IRS's use of the auditor's
workpapers turns the auditor into an unpaid informer for the govern-
ment.5' At least two courts have rejected similar conscriptions of pri-
vate citizens into governmental service. In United States v. Humble Oil
& Refning Co. 52 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused IRS
access to company business records that the IRS wanted for an IRS
research project. The court denied the IRS "an unrestricted license to
enlist the aid of citizens in its data gathering projects. ' 53 This case con-
cerned gathering data as opposed to direct IRS enforcement, so the
47. Id. at 514.
48. Id
49. It is interesting to note that the courts generally have not permitted a mind-scan of the
IRS. Barnes, supra note 22, at 46. See generally Rosenbloom, More IRS Information May Become
Public due to Amended Freedom of Information Act, 45 J. TAX'N 258, 261 (1976). This reluctance
to permit access to IRS documents is changing, however. See Tax Analyst v. IRS, 50 U.S.L.W.
2338 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1981).
50. 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); see Note, supra note 12 at 206 ("the analogy [between Hick-
man and] the workpapers is strong.").
51. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 71.
52. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 943 (1975) (to be considered in view of
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975)), aft'don rehearing, 518 F.2d 747 (1975).
53. 488 F.2d at 963.
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Court may have felt less compelled to aid the IRS. Still, the case shows
some desire to limit the IRS.
In SEC v. Arthur Young & Co. 54 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit refused to turn CPA auditors into "an enforcement arm
of the SEC."5 5 The SEC in that case wanted the auditors to adopt au-
dit standards that would be more helpful to the SEC but that exceeded
generally accepted auditing standards. Though the court recognized
the advantages to the SEC of conscripting CPAs, the court noted that
"the difficulty with [allowing such conscription] is that Congress has
not enacted the conscription bill that the SEC seeks to have us fash-
ion."' 56 Due to the nature of our self-reporting system, the IRS argua-
bly has some power to conscript necessary parties into service,57 but
Congress has not given the IRS complete conscription powers.5 8
Despite the limits of the conscription argument, using an auditor
the company hires and pays in a tax action against the company seems
unfair. The Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States implicitly
considered fairness in reviewing IRS summonses.5 9 The case involved
IRS access to information prepared by corporate employees necessary
to secure legal advice from the corporation's lawyers. Though these
employees were not members of the corporation's control group, the
Court held that the attorney work-product rule protected their work
from IRS review. Reiterating the concurrence of Hickman v. Taylor,60
the original attorney work-product case, the Court remarked: "'Dis-
covery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform
its functions . . . on wits borrowed from the adversary.' "61 Admit-
tedly, the CPA should not be an adversary of the IRS, but the CPA is
hired by the taxpayer who is the party opposing the IRS in a tax inves-
tigation. Therefore, by using the CPA's work product, the IRS takes
unfair advantage of the adversary's wits.
The preceeding argument stresses fairness; other CPA arguments
against IRS access to workpapers focus on business practicalities.
54. 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 788.
56. Id. See Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 71. Again the policy reasons for aiding the
IRS may be greater than those for aiding the SEC.
57. See Nath, supra note 6, at 1603-10.
58. Congress could require taxpayers to flag questionable items, as suggested by former IRS
Commissioner Kuntz. See Discussion on "Questionable Positions, 32 TAX LAW. 13, 15-16 (1978).
Congress has not done so and permitting IRS access to the audit workpapers is a "backdoor"
method of implementing Kurtz's proposal. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-I U.S.T.C.
9320 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. See 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981); Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 71.
60. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
61. 449 U.S. at 396 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947)).
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Courts have considered such practicalities in determining the propriety
of IRS summonses by refusing to uphold IRS summonses that are
overbroad. 62 Also, IRS policy requires that "the burden of compliance
with the [IRS] summons must not be unreasonably onerous. '63
CPAs assert that IRS access to their workpapers is detrimental to
the audit and is expensive for the auditor. Auditors cannot review
every transaction performed by a company during the year being au-
dited; instead, they must perform compliance tests to examine the com-
pany's ability to reflect its transactions fairly in its financial statements.
Certainly an audit is worth little if the company knows in advance
which transactions will be tested. Thus, work programs must be kept
secret from the company being audited.64 Unfortunately, turning work
programs over to the IRS means that companies may eventually gain
access to these work programs. 65 If the company does gain such access,
the auditor must revise the audit work programs rather than follow
common practice and reuse the programs. Even with revision, which is
expensive, the auditor may not be able to create new programs suffi-
ciently different from the old programs to preserve the integrity of the
audit.66
Despite the practical appeal of these arguments, they do have la-
tent weaknesses. Audit work programs are less secretive than the CPAs
assert. Programs are reused, and after one audit a company becomes
familiar with the common steps used in an audit. Similarly, many indi-
viduals move from accounting firms into corporate accounting depart-
ments.67 These former firm employees often know the specific
programs involved in an audit, or at least can readily guess the contents
of audit work programs because they know generally accepted auditing
practices. Thus, denying access based on a need for absolute secrecy of
audit work programs serves only a limited purpose. Also, any IRS au-
dit creates expense for someone. Hence, using expense as a criterion
for assessing the enforceability of IRS summonses could unduly limit
the IRS's ability to audit tax returns. One court has remarked that
62. See United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Har-
rington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d
532 (5th Cir. 1947).
63. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 4024.4.
64. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 948-49 (D. Colo. 1975), aft'd, 550
F. 2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
65. The IRS, as a matter of law, may be required to turn over to the taxpayer in later litiga-
tion any papers gained from the CPA auditor. 413 F.Supp. at 948. But see Nath, supra note 6, at
1595-99.
66. 413 F. Supp. at 948.
67. This is common knowledge among the "Big Eight" accounting firms.
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CPAs should consider the expense of IRS audits as an ordinary cost of
doing business. 68
Another argument against access to audit workpapers stresses the
CPA's ethical obligation not to disclose confidential information ob-
tained during an audit.6 9 This ethical argument has practical implica-
tions: companies will not give private information to their auditors
unless the auditors respect their privacy. This ethical prohibition has
limits, however. Sometimes the CPA must disclose confidential infor-
mation,70 for example, when he defends a suit charging negligence in
conducting an audit. Despite these limits, the CPA's loyalty must be to
his client. Though the CPA is the public's agent, he is still hired by the
company under audit.71
II. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM
A. IRS Self-Control as a Solution.
After several years of conflict over IRS access to auditors'
workpapers,72 the IRS partially accepted the CPAs' position because
the issue "had reached rather emotional proportions" and "had real
potential for serious negative effects on the quality of financial report-
68. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 331 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal
dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
69. 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) ET § 301.01.
70. Id.
71. Fortunately, the CPA is no longer forced into the position of choosing between dis-
obeying his client's instructions to ignore an IRS summons and facing potentially severe penalties
for not complying with the IRS's request. See Ord, note 20 supra, at 518-20. Current statutes
permit a company whose auditor receives a summons to intervene when the court considers the
enforceability of the summons. See I.R.C. § 7609. The company can then raise its own defenses
against IRS access to the CPA's workpapers.
Companies may raise, for example, defenses based on the fourth or fifth amendments. Given
the broad investigatory powers of the IRS, fourth amendment challenges tend to be unsuccessful,
though the courts will narrow the summons as appropriate. See United States v. Theodore, 479
F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320
(2d Cir. 1982); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-54 (1950); Martin, Fourth Amendment Rights in an IRS In vestigation, 48 J.
KAN. B.A. 333 (1979). But see GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
Fifth amendment protection generally is not available to an intervenor in a third party sum-
mons case because the defense adheres to the person rather than to the information. See States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973); Kenderline, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents: Powers,
Procedures and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REv. 73, 90-93 (1979); Note No Fifth Amendment
Privilege for Accountant-Prepared Tax Records in Attorney/r Possession, 31 ARK. L. REV. 152
(1977).
72. For a history of this conflict, see Internal Revenue News Release IR-81-49, [1981] 10
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6598 (remarks by Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
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ing." 73 In May, 1981 the IRS adopted new procedural guidelines that
require the IRS agent to take the following steps before summoning
auditors' workpapers:
1. The IRS agent must reconcile schedule M-1 of form 1120;7 4
2. The IRS must substantially complete the audit;
3. The agent must identify specific issues for investigation;
4. The agent must first request the needed information from the
taxpayer;
5. The agent must limit the summons to the issues specifically identi-
fied; and
6. The Chief of the Examination Division must approve the
summons.
75
These rules resolve some of the CPAs' objections to IRS access to their
workpapers. The rules eliminate fishing expeditions by requiring the
agent to identify specific issues in the summons. This limitation should
also reduce the auditors' cost of complying with IRS summonses by
reducing the number of summonses.
Because these rules do not resolve all of the CPAs' objections to
IRS access, 76 the CPAs have responded to the rule changes with
guarded optimism.77 Since IRS access to workpapers is still possible,
companies may believe they should limit communications with their
auditors. Presumably, when issuing summonses, the IRS will specifi-
cally identify the sensitive issues that the client is reluctant to discuss.
The company will remain reluctant to discuss these issues with the
CPA so long as the IRS can reach the CPAs' workpapers. Thus, the
rule changes do little to promote candor between a taxpayer and its
auditor.78 Also, the rule changes do nothing to relieve the unfairness of
using the company's own auditor against it in a tax investigation. 79
Apart from these considerations, the new rules are inadequate pri-
marily because they require the IRS to police itself. The IRS may still
determine when to issue a summons, and presumably it will favor its
interests over those of others. Once the IRS has decided to summon
workpapers, the courts may allow the IRS to gain access to them.80
Certainly, given the split in the courts over IRS access, no one will
73. Id.
74. The 1120 is the corporate tax return. The Schedule M-1 is the form on which the agent
reconciles book income and taxable income.
75. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 4024.4. (rules are paraphrased).
76. See notes 29-71 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Hanson & Brown, supra note 13; Sumner & Reed, supra note 12.
78. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
80. See note 12 supra.
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depend fully on the courts for protection.8' Also, the courts have con-
sidered IRS guidelines, which require the agency to comply with inter-
nal IRS procedures before requesting workpapers, to be merely
nonbinding, informal rules.82 The IRS appears free to interpret the
reach of its guidelines without meaningful review by the courts; there-
fore, the present rules leave much control over access to workpapers
with the IRS. Resolution of the problem requires more protection for
the workpapers.
B. Proposals by the CPAs.
CPAs have proposed that they limit the audit work they perform
by revising the requirements of FASB 5. concerning the contingency
review of tax accounts.8 3 For example, the portions of GAAP that re-
quire contingency review of the tax accounts could be abandoned. This
self-protecting solution, however, would be harmful to both the public
and the CPA profession. It would result in a less complete audit and
the ultimate losers would be the investing public.
Another proposed solution is to change documentation procedures
to ensure that the IRS could gain little from reviewing CPA audit
workpapers.8 4 These workpapers guide the auditor in his work and
provide support for his audit opinion.85 Also, they are the basis for
review of the audit work by supervisors.8 6 These functions help to
maintain the quality of the audit. If the auditor disguises his audit doc-
umentation, the workpapers will not fully serve their purposes. In ad-
81. See text accompanying notes 11-12 infra.
82. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 331 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed
as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); see also United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
83. Diss & Hanson, supra note 41, at 114.
84. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 74-75. Work programs list the audit steps to be
performed. The auditor completes each step and records on the audit program the location of the
workpaper schedule that shows the documentation of the completed work. The schedule in the
workpapers gives the details of the audit work performed and the results of the work. In the
schedule the auditor lists contingencies found in the tax analysis and then discusses the potential
impact of these contingencies on the financial statements. The proposed alternative requires only a
yes or no answer on the work program. Specifically, the audit work program would say: "Will
any tax contingencies materially impact the financial statements?" The auditor generally would
answer "no." This change would result in the IRS learning little from the audit workpapers.
Beyond these simple answers, the CPA would prepare no record of the audit work.
85. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 338.02.
86. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 74. The first standard of audit field work requires
that "assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised." 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(CCH) AU § 150.02. This supervisory review is necessary as field work is often performed by
accountants with limited audit experience. More experienced CPAs then review the workpaper
documentation of work performed.
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dition, forcing professional accountants to disguise their work is as
untenable as forcing attorneys to leave their legal arguments unwritten.
The Hickman work-product rule protects attorneys from that threat;8 7
similar protection for CPAs is reasonable.
C. Possible Judicial Responses.
A solution to the problem could come from the courts, but they
would have to abandon some established precedents. In view of the
IRS's tacit acceptance of the CPAs' arguments, and the increasing ten-
sions generated by this conflict, the courts should make such a
reassessment.
The Court in United States v. Powell88 established the basic test the
courts use to review the propriety of an IRS summons. According to
Powell, the IRS "must show that the investigation will be conducted
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to
the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Com-
missioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by
the Code have been followed."8 9 The IRS usually has little problem
showing a legitimate purpose for an investigation, given the courts' lib-
eral views of the IRS's investigatory powers. 90 Compliance with ad-
ministrative steps is seldom difficult because Powell requires only
procedural compliance with the tax code.9 1 Thus, litigation usually fo-
cuses on two issues: whether the information is relevant and whether
the information is already in the Commissioner's possession.
Most litigation has concerned the relevancy of the auditor's
workpapers.92 These workpapers generally are not sources for tax re-
turn preparation.93 They contain either basic information supplied by
87. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
88. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
89. Id. at 57-58. The courts have applied this test in numerous cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 619-20 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327-28 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
90. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
91. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co.,
515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
92. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co.,
515 F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. II. 1981); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp.
322, 327-30 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1021 (1980).
93. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1977). Audit
workpapers usually are not used in tax return preparation. Auditors do not perform tax return
services as part of an audit, and in a large CPA firm, the audit and tax departments are generally
separate. The CPA firm in Coopers & Lybrand had no return preparation responsibilities. Id. In
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the company or the CPA's analysis of that information. The
workpapers often contain conjectures. Thus the CPAs argue that such
speculative papers are irrelevant to the IRS's investigation of the com-
pany's actual tax return.94
Several courts have disagreed with the CPAs.95 Their analysis has
been guided by the liberal construction required by the wording of sec-
tion 7602,96 which permits access to information that "may be relevant"
to determining the correctness of a tax return.97 All the IRS must show
is that the desired records might throw light upon the correctness of a
taxpayer's return.98 Admittedly, the auditor's workpapers do shed
some light on the taxpayer's tax positions, but their focus is on the po-
tential effect of these positions on the financial statements rather than
on the correctness of the tax return. 99 Auditor's workpapers thus reflect
only indirectly on the tax position and should be regarded as little more
than a convenience to the IRS.
The courts generally do not allow convenience alone to justify IRS
access to records. 1°° For example, in United States v. Matras,10 1 the
court refused to enforce an IRS summons requesting budgets prepared
by the company. The court held that these budgets were not relevant to
the tax return because they reflected only the company's plans for the
year under review, not the actual figures used in computing the tax
contrast, in the Arthur Andersen case, the CPA firm did perform return preparation services. See
474 F. Supp. at 323-24.
As a practical matter, an auditing firm that also prepares the audited company's tax returns
may use the audit workpapers to assist with the tax return. If so, the specific workpapers used
should be accessible to the IRS. Tax investigations would be impossible if taxpayers and their tax
preparers could deny the IRS access to tax preparation materials.
94. See cases cited in note 92 supra.
95. See note 12 supra. See also, United States v. El Paso Co., 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9534 (5th Cir.
1982).
96. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit applied this liberal construction to permit access to the auditors' workpapers in general.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982). Similarly, the court
noted that the tax accrual workpapers were relevant, but denied access on public policy grounds.
Id
97. See note 7 supra.
98. United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074
(1970); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Harrington, 388
F.2d 520, 523-24 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 912 (1959).
99. See text accompanying notes 29-30supra. Financial statements are correct if they comply
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Tax returns must comply with the tax code.
GAAP and tax requirements are often quite different.
100. See, ag., United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 620-21 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 988 (3d Cir. 1980).
101. 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
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liability.10 2 The tax contingency memorandum also contains specula-
tions rather than actual results. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
the district court held the audit work programs to be irrelevant because
they were too "many steps removed from the question of the actual tax
liability."'' 0 3 And in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand the court held
that the IRS had not shown that either the auditor's work programs or
the tax accrual workpapers were relevant. 0 Thus, the courts have used
irrelevancy to limit access to some of the workpapers.
Litigation has also focused on whether the information is already
in the IRS's possession.'05 The courts have held that the IRS has the
right not only to the company's factual information, but also to the
CPA's opinion based on this information. 0 6 The CPA's opinion is in
the audit workpapers. Although without these workpapers the IRS
does not have the full opinion of the CPA, the IRS probably could
obtain every material fact in the CPA's workpapers from the taxpayer
company without actually obtaining the workpapers. For example, the
most important information, the tax return preparation materials,
should be either in the company's possession or obtainable from the
company's auditor.10 7
In addition, companies also possess much information discovered
by CPAs during their audits. Although auditors are generally not re-
quired to publicly "blow the whistle" on companies, an auditor who
finds material problems in the tax analysis will notify the company of
them. 08 This notification to the company may take several forms, any
of which the IRS should be able to obtain from the taxpayer.'0 9 Mate-
rial accounting errors, including understated tax liabilities, require au-
dit adjustments. 1 0 Companies must have these adjustments to
reconcile their general ledgers with their financial statements, so the
102. Id. at 1273-75.
103. 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir.
1982).
104. 550 F.2d 615, 619-21 (10th Cir. 1977).
105. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
106. CPA arguments alleging possession have been rejected by "every court that has consid-
ered the question" because "the IRS has the right to review documents containing opinions, re-
gardless of whether the government already has documents that contain the factual basis for those
opinions." United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
107. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
108. See Chazen, Miller & Solomon, When the Rules Say: "See Your Lawyer", J. AccT. 60,
66-70 (Jan. 1981). After the auditor notifies the company, the IRS should have access to informa-
tion on which the notification is based unless such information is protected by a privilege. See
notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 71 supra and text accompanying notes 114-19 infra concerning IRS access to
taxpayer information generally.
110. COOK & vINKLE, AUDITING PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNIQUE 198-99 (1976).
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IRS should be able to obtain these from the company. If a necessary
audit adjustment is not made to the financial statements, then the audit
opinion will be qualified." l' The IRS can gain access to company
financial statements. IRS procedures require the agent to determine
why opinions are qualified; 1 2 companies must supply this information.
If the CPA finds internal control deficiencies he must report them to
the company, 113 and the IRS can obtain this report from the com-
pany.114 Furthermore, "material errors or irregularities" discovered by
the auditor must be reported to the company's board of directors."
5
The directors of the company should discuss these errors at the board
of directors meeting, and the IRS can gain access to the minutes of the
meeting from the company."l 6 Auditors encountering material irregu-
larities may withdraw from the audit1 7 and the IRS can easily dis-
cover, often from company filings with the SEC, that the company has
changed auditors." 8 The IRS can ask the company the reason for the
change. Thus, the IRS can discover the gist of the CPAs' assessment of
the tax accounts without reviewing the workpapers. The goal of access
to material,' 19 tax-related information can be fulfilled, therefore, with-
out the problems inherent in full access to the auditors' workpapers.
The preceeding discussion shows that a reassessment of the Powell
tests of relevancy and IRS possession could help resolve the conflict
over access to CPA workpapers. This approach, however, would mean
overturning established precedents, which is unlikely. Overturning
these precedents, even if all courts were willing to do so, would take
time. During this waiting period communications between CPAs and
companies will continue to deteriorate. Any change that comes may
111. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 328.15.
112. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 4026.
113. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 323.01. Internal controls are the
company's checks in its accounting system designed to ensure proper accounting for financial
transactions. CPAs, as part of their audit, review the company's accounting system and its internal
controls. Id.
114. United States v. Riley, 45 A.F.T.R. 2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (mem.) appeal dismissed,
No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
115. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 327.14.
116. United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
117. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 4026.
118. Chazen, supra note 108, at 69-70. SEC form 8-K requires companies to disclose changes
in auditors and the reasons for these changes. Id.
119. These alternate methods may not give the IRS access to items noted by the auditor that
are immaterial from a GAAP standpoint. A basic feature of financial accounting is its stress on
materiality. "[Flinancial reporting is only concerned with significant information." 3 AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AC § 1022.17. Thus the auditor's work and his results are
directed at material items with materiality measured in relation to the financial statements taken
as a whole. Presumably, an IRS agent focuses more on materiality with respect to the tax return.
Any illegality noted by the CPA is material. Id
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arrive too late. Thus, although review by the Supreme Court would
resolve the conflict in a timely manner, waiting for the lower courts to
reassess the Powell tests is not a viable solution to this immediate
problem.
Another possible solution to the problem is for courts to perform
in camera review of workpapers to determine if the workpapers are
relevant. Without this review, the courts tend to be liberal in defining
relevancy because they are unable to fully understand the
workpapers. 120 Despite this risk of overbroad interpretation of the rele-
vancy test, the courts have generally refused to perform in camera in-
spections because they consider them to be so "burdensome" and
"impossible of performance" that Congress could not have intended
busy district court judges to perform them in CPA workpaper cases. 121
This recalcitrant attitude toward in camera inspections is unrealis-
tic because the papers actually in dispute are fairly limited in number
and in length. Audit workpapers may be voluminous as a whole, but
the real dispute does not concern all of the CPAs' workpapers. The
dispute concerns the audit work programs and the tax accrual contin-
gency memoranda. 122 Work programs generally are not overly long
and are repetitive, so judicial review would not be difficult. 123 More
importantly, the tax accrual memorandum, the most critical item, is
generally no longer than a few pages; certainly even a busy district
court judge could review it, given the serious issues involved.
Courts could also remedy the problem of access to CPA
workpapers by establishing an accountant-client privilege. 124 At pres-
ent no such privilege exists under federal law,1 25 although sixteen states
120. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 74.
121. United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1978) (referring to internal audit
workpapers); see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'dinpart, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982). The government objected to in camera review
in the Coopers & Lybrand case. Barnes, supra note 18, at 45. The IRS opposes in camera review
because of its desire to protect its "prerogative to conduct independent audits and decide for itself
what is relevant." Nath, supra note 6, at 1615.
122. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
123. This assumes, of course, that the court needs to review them; two cases have held that
these programs are not relevant. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
124. See Hanson & Brown, supra, note 13 at 76. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
adopted a limited accountant work product "privilege" to protect parts of the audit workpapers in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982).
125. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); United States v. Price Waterhouse &
Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp.
322, 326-27 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1021 (1980); 13 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 37 (1967). The Fifth Circuit recently held that because no
accountant-client privilege exists, showing workpapers to the company's independent CPA audi-
tors violates the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. El Paso Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9534
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do recognize such a privilege. 126 These state laws are not binding, how-
ever, in federal administrative proceedings. 127
Establishment of a federal accountant-client privilege would prob-
ably require congressional action; however, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence might allow the courts to establish such a privilege. The rules
impose on the courts "a special duty to clarify aspects of the law of
privileges."'128 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that privileges are
"governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience."' 29 This flexible rule evinces a congressional intent "not to
freeze tle law of privileges."' 130 No accountant-client privilege existed
at common law' 3' because accounting has only recently achieved pro-
fessional status. Today, stringent professional regulations, similar to
those governing the legal profession, 32 govern the accounting profes-
sion. Work performed by CPAs, particularly in the tax field, often re-
sembles that of lawyers. 33 For example, CPAs prepare tax returns and
advise clients on requirements of the tax code just as lawyers do. Be-
cause lawyers are bound by an attorney-client privilege, recognition of
an accountant-client privilege could be viewed as an interpretation of
the common law in light of modem reason and experience.
Communications to the modem CPA do meet the requirements
asserted by Wigmore for privilege:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(5th Cir. 1982). Privileges are generally waived by showing documents to outside parties; how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit's approach increases the penalty for candid discussion with the company's
CPA. But see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2nd Cir. 1982) (adopt-
ing an auditors' work product "privilege").
126. Hanson & Brown, supra note 13, at 72; JentzAccouniant Privileged Communications.- Is it
a Dying Concept Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence?, I1 AM. Bus. L.J. 149, 152 (1973).
127. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953); Jentz, supra note 126 at 149-50.
128. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 403 (1981) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
129. FED. R. EviD. 501.
130. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
131. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
132. See Katsoris, Confidential Communications-7he Accountants'Dilemma, 35 FORDHAM L.
Rav. 51 (1966). Accountants govern themselves with regulations. See, e.g., 1-4 AICPA PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS (CCH). These regulations are similar to the American Bar Association rules
governing lawyers. In addition, the states regulate the public practice of CPAs. These require-
ments generally include a national CPA examination and a one to five year experience require-
ment. See generally ACCOUNTANCY L. REP. (CCH) (compilation of state accountancy rules).
133. Jentz, supra note 126, at 151.
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3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the beneit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation. 134
Companies expect that communications with their auditors will be kept
confidential. This confidentiality must be preserved if companies are to
confide in their auditors. Confidentiality is important because the busi-
ness community considers full disclosure to CPAs necessary to protect
the public from economic injury.1 35
Establishing a full accountant-client privilege would resolve the
audit workpaper conflict, but creating this privilege raises certain ob-
jections such that many commentators do not believe that CPXs should
have this privilege.136 First, any such privilege would have to be lim-
ited because CPAs sometimes need to disclose the contents of their
workpapers. For example, a CPA may need to use the workpapers to
defend a suit for negligently conducting an audit. A privilege of the
CPA's client could greatly limit the CPA's ability to do this.137 Second,
the policy in this country is to limit privileges, not to extend them. As
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Nixon:138 "[t]he public
... has a right to every man's evidence."' 139 Thus, creating a full ac-
countant-client privilege is not necessarily an acceptable solution to the
IRS-CPA workpaper conflict. The courts could, though, create a lim-
ited privilege such as the attorney work-product rule created by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor 140 and now embodied in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26.141 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit adopted this approach in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
134. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). Wig-
more also recognized a privilege concerning information given to persons who appear before ad-
ministrative tribunals representing parties in interest "as a licensed body having the
responsibilities of attorneys and subject to professional discipline." Id. § 2300(a). See also Fal-
sone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). CPAs are a
licensed body with professional discipline and responsibility similar to that of attorneys. See note
132 supra.
135. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
136. See Jentz, supra note 126, at 156-59 (list of arguments both for and against accountant-
client privilege); Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant and Client, 46 N.C.L.
REV. 419 (1968) (opposing privilege). But see Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and
Accounting-A Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1264
(1968) (supporting privilege).
137. Jentz, supra note 126, at 157.
138. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
139. Id. at 709 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
140. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 146-47 infra.
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the most recent CPA workpaper case. 142 Since the courts have split
over the adoption of such a rule, however, this comment advocates that
Congress take action to resolve the problem.
D. Possible Congressional Solution.
Congress could resolve the conflict between the CPAs and the IRS
by amending section 7602 of the Code to limit access to certain third-
party records. 143 The IRS opposes such a change, claiming that the
IRS "would lose all flexibility to see workpapers,"' 144 but a congres-
sional change need not be that restrictive. The workpapers actually in
dispute, the tax contingency memoranda and the audit work pro-
grams, 45 are limited in number and content so only a limited change
would be necessary to resolve this problem. The protection should be
broad enough, however, to include workpapers with information com-
parable to that in the tax contingency memorandum, which is located
elsewhere in the auditors' workpapers.
As the Arthur Young court and one commentator have concluded,
a rule similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, concerning the
attorney's work product, would be a feasible solution.' 46 Rule 26 per-
mits discovery of an attorney's work product "only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
... and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent." Rule 26 further provides that "the court shall pro-
tect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
142. 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982). The rule adopted in Arthur Young seems to have
two possible limitations. First, it appears limited to companies governed directly by the securities
laws. It is anomolous, though, to give the work-product privilege to the most highly regulated
companies while denying it to other, generally smaller, companies that are less exposed to public
scrutiny.
Second, the Arthur Young court seems to say the privilege would cease to exist in a fraud
investigation. Id at 83828. This is reasonable, but it ignores the duty of the CPA to indirectly
"blow the whistle" on fraud. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text. Thus if the
workpapers reveal fraud, other more accessible means should also reveal fraud.
143. See Sumner & Reed, supra note 12 at 75. See also Reports of Committees, 34 TAX LAW.
897, 897 (1981) (An ABA subcommittee is presently working on a legislative proposal to give a
qualified privilege to accountants' workpapers). See generally Diss & Hanson, supra note 41 at
114; Hanson & Brown, supra note 13 at 76; Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents and
Auditors' Workpapers: Shall we Include Auditors Among the Privilegedfew? J. CORP. LAW 367,
387-88 (1977).
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co. Judge Newman argued that Congress should be the
body to adopt the accountants' workpaper privilege advocated by the majority. See 82-1 U.S.T.C.
9320 (2d Cir. 1982) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. Tax Feature, J. OF ACCT. 51, 51 (Sept. 1981).
145. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
146. See 82-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9320; Note, supra note 12 at 206-09.
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or legal theories of an attorney." 47 A similar rule for the auditor's
work product would permit IRS access to the audit workpapers if they
are the only reasonable source of information, thereby allowing the
IRS to fulfill its investigatory responsibilities. At the same time, the
proposed rule would bar any access to mental impressions, which
would include the tax contingency memoranda and, arguably, the audit
work programs.148 This limitation should satisfy the CPAs.
Limiting IRS access by means of a CPA work-product rule finds
support in analogous limitations imposed on the IRS by the attorney
work-product rule and the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme
Court recently held in Upjohn Co. v. United States149 that the attorney
work-product rule applies to IRS summons proceedings. The Court
recognized the "strong public policy" implications of this rule.' 50 As
discussed earlier, many of these public policy concerns are analogous to
the policy implications of a CPA work-product rule for auditors.' 51 In
addition, the Upjohn Court extended the attorney-client privilege to
company personnel outside of the company's control group, thus
adopting the broadest privilege recognized for corporate employees as-
sisting an attorney.' 52 The Court did so despite its general policy
favoring liberal discovery, 153 and despite the broad investigatory pow-
ers of the IRS.'5 4 The Court considered the policy implications of the
attorney-client privilege paramount: "Its purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests."' 55 Full and frank commu-
nications to CPAs also promote public interests. 156 That the Upjohn
Court was willing to balance important policy considerations in ex-,
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Admittedly, this rule relates to materials "prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation." Id. This requirement arises from the nature of an attorney's work and should
not affect the remaining analysis of the need for a work-product rule for CPAs.
148. The audit work programs are the CPA's mental impression of the proper steps to be
completed in auditing a company's financial statements. This application of the mental-impres-
sions test to audit work programs is somewhat tenuous, but the reasons for protection of the audit
work programs are equally tenuous. See text accompanying notes 64-6 supra. Also, the work
programs may be protected by the Powell relevancy test and, hence, may be less vulnerable. See
text accompanying notes 103-04 supra. The proposed test would provide courts with the leeway to
protect the audit work programs in the appropriate case, but would permit IRS access to the work
programs if the policy reasons for access override those reasons against it.
149. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
150. Id. at 397-402.
151. See notes 45-50, 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
152. 449 U.S. at 390-97.
153. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
155. 449 U.S. at 389.
156. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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tending the attorney-client privilege to IRS proceedings suggests that
extending a similar, limited protection for CPAs is reasonable, given
the important policy considerations for protecting CPAs' workpapers.
It was this balancing approach that the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit used to create, in effect, an accountant work-product privi-
lege in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 157
III. CONCLUSION
The conflict between the CPAs and the IRS over auditors'
workpapers has already begun to limit the CPAs' ability to perform an
audit sufficient to meet the needs of the investing public.'5 8 Recogniz-
ing this, the IRS has changed its procedures to limit its interference
with CPA audits. The effectiveness of these changes depends on IRS
self-control, however.' 5 9 CPAs are unwilling to depend on this IRS
self-control and have suggested changes in the audit process that ulti-
mately will reduce the effectiveness of the audit. 60 Thus, more protec-
tion for the auditor's workpapers is needed. The courts could provide
this protection by reassessing the precedents in this area of the law, but
judicial change might come too slowly to provide the immediate pro-
tection auditors need.' 6' Therefore, Congress should amend section
7602 of the Code to limit access to certain third party documents.' 62
In determining which documents should be protected, Congress
must consider the needs of both the IRS and the CPAs. The IRS must
not be unduly limited in its ability to investigate, so the limitations in
the new law must be specific. Only the tax contingency memorandum
and the audit work programs, both of which contain the CPAs' mental
impressions concerning the company's tax positions and audit proce-
dures, need protection.' 63 Thus, a rule similar to the attorney work-
product rule, which permits access to workpapers when necessary to
avoid hardship but permits no access to mental impressions, should sat-
isfy both the CPAs and the IRS.
Jean Gordon Carter
157. 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Note, supra note 12 at 206-09.
158. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
159. See text accompanying notes 72-81 supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
161. See text preceding note 120 supra.
162. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 145-48 supra and accompanying text.
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